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One of the most pressing philosophical problems in early modern Europe concerned 
how the soul and body could form a unity, or, as many understood it, how these two 
substances could work together. It was widely believed that there were three (and 
only three) hypotheses regarding the union of soul and body: (1) physical influence, 
(2) occasionalism, and (3) pre- established harmony. However, in 1763, a fourth hy-
pothesis was put forward by the French thinker André- Pierre Le Guay de Prémont-
val (1716– 1764). Prémontval’s hypothesis, given the grand name of “psychocracy” 
(i.e., the dominion or the rule of the soul), held that there was a real influence be-
tween soul and body, but that this was an immaterial kind of influence as opposed 
to the physical kind that had been entertained heretofore. Prémontval’s hypothesis 
is the focus of this paper. I shall begin by sketching out the details of Prémontval’s 
hypothesis (Section 1), then proceed to consider its claims to constitute a true fourth 
hypothesis distinct from the other three (Section 2), before closing by briefly consid-
ering two objections and the responses either that Prémontval himself made or that 
may be made on his behalf (Section 3).
Descartes’s decision to separate the human being into two separate substances— soul (mind) and body— struck many in the early modern pe-
riod as introducing a new problem, namely how these two substances could 
form a unity, or, as many understood it, how these two substances could be in 
commerce with each other. In the years that followed, a number of distinct solu-
tions to this problem were put forward. According to Leibniz’s assessment at 
the end of the 17th century, there were three hypotheses regarding the union of 
soul and body: (1) physical influx (or influence), (2) occasionalism, and (3) pre- 
established harmony.1 According to the physical influx hypothesis (or Leibniz’s 
1. See Leibniz (1997: 62, 106). Leibniz sometimes referred to the first as “the way of influence,” 
and the second as “the way of assistance.”
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presentation of it anyway),2 the soul is able to act on the body and the body is 
able to act on the soul, with this typically conceived in terms of a transfer of parts 
or qualities.3 According to occasionalism, soul and body do not act upon each 
other, and instead a third being, God, acts to produce certain modifications in 
the soul on the occasion of certain movements of the body, and certain modifi-
cations in the body on the occasion of certain thoughts or feelings in the soul. 
And according to pre- established harmony, soul and body do not act upon each 
other, but they nevertheless correspond perfectly merely by adhering to their 
own laws which God arranged from the outset.
In the second edition of his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1702), Pierre Bay-
le accepted Leibniz’s claim that there were only these three hypotheses,4 and the 
claim was repeated well into the 18th century by a number of other thinkers such 
as Johann Billeb,5 Christian Wolff,6 Friedrich Baumeister,7 and Samuel Formey.8 
At the same time, others such as Georg Bilfinger,9 Samuel Hollmann,10 Andreas 
Böhm,11 Alexander Baumgarten,12 and Immanuel Kant,13 made the much stron-
ger claim that only these three hypotheses were possible. Böhm (1767: 420, §624), 
2. O’ Neill (1993) has argued that the theory of physical influx Leibniz discusses appears to be 
his own invention, and that what Leibniz presented as the hypothesis of physical influx was in fact 
a complex of various neo- Platonic, Scholastic, and corpuscular models. While I am sympathetic to 
O’ Neill’s claim (1993: 52) that the theory of physical influx was “an artificial construction” rather 
than “a particular position that had avowed supporters,” it is notable that many early modern op-
ponents of physical influx did think of the theory in the way outlined by Leibniz.
3. There were of course other 17th century theories regarding the relationship between soul 
and body, such as Hobbes’s materialist view and Spinoza’s identity (or double aspect) theory, but 
these were often ignored because they rejected the initial assumption at the heart of the problem of 
soul- body union, namely that soul and body are distinct types of substances.
4. Bayle (1702: III, 2610, article Rorarius, note L). English translation: Bayle (1991: 245).
5. Billeb (1725: 8, §4).
6. Wolff (1737b: 270, §553).
7. Baumeister (1754: 470– 473, §720).
8. Formey (1766: 364).
9. Bilfinger (1723: 13, §17): in the matter of the agreement of soul and body, “either one is the 
determining cause of the other (see influx), or both are determined by the same cause, and that ei-
ther by an action that is always repeated and immediate (see Malebranchism) or by means of some 
order established in the beginning (see pre- established harmony).” Unless otherwise indicated, all 
translations in this paper are my own.
10. Hollmann (1724: 6, §2): “For if two very diverse substances should conspire with each 
other in their operations, it is necessary either that one directs and moves the other, or that a com-
mon mediator intervenes between them, or each perpetually acts of itself but in agreement with 
the other.”
11. Böhm (1767: 418, §623): “There are three systems that have been invented by philosophers 
hitherto.” And (1767: 421, §624): “besides these three systems there is no fourth.”
12. Baumgarten (1750: 133, §458): “Aside from the universal systems of pre- established har-
mony, physical influence, and occasional causes, no fourth simple universal system is possible.”
13. Kant (1998: 436, A390): “The three usual systems that have been thought up about this [sc., 
the community between soul and body], really the only possible ones, are those of physical influ-
ence, of preestablished harmony, and of supernatural assistance.”
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for example, explains that there can be only three hypotheses because if we sup-
pose two conspiring substances, we can see that the reason for their agreement 
has to be found (1) in each substance itself (in which case the pre- established 
harmony is true), or (2) in the other substance (in which case the hypothesis of 
physical influence is true), or (3) in some third substance (in which case occa-
sionalism is true), with these exhausting the available possibilities.
By the middle of the 18th century, the claim that only these three hypotheses 
were possible had become part of the philosophical orthodoxy, but in 1763 it 
came under challenge from the French thinker André- Pierre Le Guay de Pré-
montval (1716– 1764) who put forward a purported fourth hypothesis in a series 
of memoirs read at the Berlin Academy of Sciences, of which he was a member.14 
Prémontval’s own hypothesis, to which he gave the grand name of “psychoc-
racy” (i.e., the dominion of the soul), suggested that there was a real reciprocal 
action between soul and body, but that this was an immaterial or non- physical 
kind of action as opposed to the physical kind that had been entertained hereto-
fore. Prémontval’s hypothesis is the focus of this paper. I shall begin by sketching 
out the details of Prémontval’s hypothesis (Section 1), then proceed to consider 
its claims to constitute a true fourth hypothesis distinct from the other three (Sec-
tion 2), before closing by briefly considering two objections and the responses ei-
ther that Prémontval himself made or that may be made on his behalf (Section 3).
1. Prémontval’s Psychocracy
In the meeting of the Berlin Academy of 14 April 1763, its permanent secretary, 
Samuel Formey, delivered a short memoir on the union of the soul and body,15 
prompted by his reading of an article published four years earlier in the Nova 
14. Prémontval was not the first to claim to have invented a fourth hypothesis. For example, 
in a short tract published in 1738, Johann Ernst Schubert offered a “new way of explaining the 
commerce between the soul and the body” which he called “the system of agreement.” He at-
tributed to the soul a faculty of observing and perceiving the changes that are excited in body’s 
sensory organs, and of subsequently representing these changes in itself through its own repre-
sentative power. However, according to Schubert, there is no action of soul upon the body, as the 
body merely follows the natural laws of motion when bringing about its changes, with God having 
paired up bodies and souls in such a way that a soul willing its body to do X was united with a 
body that he knew would do X at that time. On this basis, the suggestion by two modern scholars 
that “Actually, his [Schubert’s] theory was a form of pre- established harmony” does not seem too 
wide of the mark, though it is worth noting that Schubert supposed that his hypothesis offered a 
new way of understanding the relationship between soul and body because each perception in the 
soul is not transmitted from the body to the soul, is not produced by the action of God, and is not 
the consequence of any preceding perception either. See Schubert (1738, especially 9– 16). For the 
“two modern scholars,” see Klemme and Kuehn (2016: 699).
15. Subsequently published as Formey (1766).
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Acta Eruditorum by Johann Jacob Hentsch (1759), which sought to defend a 
new interpretation of the hypothesis of physical influx (we shall learn more of 
Hentsch’s hypothesis later). In his memoir, Formey surveyed first occasional-
ism, then pre- established harmony, and finally the hypothesis of physical in-
flux, concluding that each hypothesis had its difficulties and that therefore the 
problem of the union of soul and body was one that had not yet been answered 
satisfactorily. Prémontval, who was present at the reading of Formey’s memoir, 
felt stirred enough by it to present his own solution to the problem. What pro-
voked Prémontval was not Formey’s analysis or conclusion, but his suggestion, 
or rather assumption, that there were only three hypotheses on the problem of 
the union of soul and body (see Formey 1766: 365). Believing that he had devel-
oped a fourth hypothesis, and in fact had already presented much of it, albeit 
obliquely, to the Academy back in 1755 in his memoir “La théologie de l’etre,”16 
Prémontval set to work developing his hypothesis. He ended up writing so 
much material that it had to be delivered in six separate memoirs that were read 
at the Berlin Academy between June and November 1763,17 and subsequently 
published in successive volumes of the Academy’s proceedings as three lengthy 
essays.18
The six memoirs on the union of soul and body were entitled “On Psychoc-
racy; or On the dominion and governance of the soul over the multitude of 
beings— likewise simple but of an inferior nature— of which the body is com-
posed. Fourth hypothesis on the union of the body and the soul.” In a novel 
opening move, Prémontval states that there are really two main hypotheses on 
the union of soul and body: the first recognizes a real action between soul and 
body, while the second recognizes only an apparent action between them. He 
then claims that each of the two hypotheses can be further subdivided into two 
systems, the hypothesis of apparent action into the systems of occasionalism 
and pre- established harmony, and the hypothesis of real action into the systems 
of physical influx and his own psychocracy.19 The situation as he sees it can be 
depicted thus (I have indicated who he takes to be the chief representative of 
each system):
16. Prémontval (1757). English translation: Prémontval (2018: 169– 196).
17. The dates were 16 June, 21 July, 25 August, 29 September, 10 November, and 17 Novem-
ber. See the registers for these dates held by the Archiv der Berlin- Brandenburgischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften under the shelfmark I IV 31/12, Bl. 18, 21, 23, 25, 28 and 29.
18. (1) Prémontval (1766). English translation: Prémontval (2018: 239– 271). (2) Prémontval 
(1768a). English translation: Prémontval (2018: 273– 295). (3) Prémontval (1768b). English transla-
tion: Prémontval (2018: 297– 333).
19. Prémontval (1766: 378– 379/2018: 244). When citing Prémontval’s works, I give the original 
language reference first followed by the English translation.
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With this classification in place, Prémontval outlines his own system before 
proceeding to examine the alternatives. His exposition begins with an outline of 
his ontology, much of which is drawn— verbatim— from an earlier memoir, “La 
théologie de l’être,” which had been read at the Academy in 1755 and published 
in its proceedings in two parts (one in 1757, the other in 1759).20 It starts thus:
That which exists is only a single being, or there are several beings.
If there is something that is only a single being and not several be-
ings, I call it simple being.
If there is something that is several beings and not a single being, I 
call it composite being.
Every composite being, or every collection of several beings, is not a 
single being, but several beings . . . . 
Several presupposes the unity of that of which there are several.
Several beings presuppose the unity of beings.21
Several beings presuppose something that is only one being and not 
several beings.
Every composite presupposes the simple.
If there are beings, there are simple beings, and strictly speaking 
there are only simple beings.
That is, strictly speaking, every composite being is not a being, but a 
collection of several beings.
20. Prémontval (1757). The second part of the piece was published as Prémontval (1759); Eng-
lish translation: Prémontval (2018: 197– 218).
21. In Prémontval (1757) this line reads: “Several beings presuppose the unity of being.”
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Lastly, I lay it down as an axiom that a being is not several beings, but 
a single being. (Prémontval 1766: 380/2018: 250; 1757: 476– 477/2018: 170– 
171)
Much of this reads like the opening sections of Leibniz’s “Monadology” (see 
Leibniz 2014: 14, “Monadology” §§1– 3), though Prémontval claims that his in-
spiration was not Leibniz but rather a brief passage on unity in a mathematics 
textbook written by Nicolas de Malezieu.22 Nevertheless, Prémontval makes a 
number of other claims that again map well on to those found in the “Monadol-
ogy,” for example that every simple is different from every other (Prémontval 
1766: 389/2018: 251; 1757: 477/2018: 171– 172; cf. Leibniz 2014: 15, “Monadology” 
§9), that every simple has a plurality (possibly even an infinity) of properties 
(Prémontval 1766: 394/2018: 254; 1757: 478– 479/2018: 172; cf. Leibniz 2014: 15– 
16, “Monadology” §8, §13), giving each simple being different degrees of force 
(Prémontval 1766: 404/2018: 261), and that change in composites presupposes 
change in some or all of the simples that compose it (Prémontval 1766: 404– 
405/2018: 261– 262; 1757: 481/2018: 174; cf. Leibniz 2014: 15, “Monadology” §8). 
Prémontval stops short of adopting a full- blown Leibnizian monadology by 
refusing to accept that simples have only a force or power to act upon them-
selves.23 Moreover, while Leibniz recognized three grades of monad or simple 
substance, namely bare monads (which have only confused perceptions), souls 
(which also have distinct perceptions and memory), and minds (which are souls 
that also possess reason and a moral identity), Prémontval appears to recognize 
only two, claiming that all simples are “capable of feeling” and some also capa-
ble of thought (1755b: 210/2018: 69). Despite these differences, it is clear that Pré-
22. Malezieu (1705: 135): “when I consider attentively the existence of beings, I very clearly 
understand that existence belongs to unities, and not to numbers. I will explain. Twenty men exist 
only because each man exists. Number is only an external denomination, or to put it in a better 
way, a repetition of unities, to which alone existence belongs. There cannot ever be numbers if 
there are no unities. There cannot ever be twenty men unless there is one man. This being rightly 
conceived, I ask you: is this cubic foot of matter a single substance, or is it several? You cannot say 
that it is a single substance, for then you could not divide it in two. If you say that it is several sub-
stances, because there are several of them in it, this number, whatever it is, is composed of unities. 
If there are several existing substances, it must be the case that there is one of them, and this one 
cannot be two of them. Therefore matter is composed of indivisible substances. Here is our argu-
ment reduced to strange extremes. Geometry shows us the divisibility of matter to infinity, and we 
find at the same time that it is composed of indivisibles.”
23. Prémontval (1768a: 356/2018: 283) reasons as follows: on Leibniz’s view, “God has given 
a force to every being, not to act upon another being but to act upon itself,” and this because he 
supposed it was “easier . . . to conceive the action of a being upon itself than to conceive the action 
of one being upon another being.” But according to Prémontval, “Both actions are just as incon-
ceivable. If we deny one, we must deny the other; if we affirm one, we must affirm the other.” 
Consequently, if a being can act upon itself (as both Leibniz and Prémontval accept), there is no 
reason to suppose— pace Leibniz— that it cannot act upon others also.
 The “Fourth Hypothesis” on the Early Modern Mind-Body Problem • 671
Ergo • vol. 5, no. 25 • 2018
montval’s simples, like Leibnizian monads, are neither material nor extended, as 
he reserves the terms “matter” and “extension” for the collection of all imperfect 
simples, that is, all bar God.24 Nevertheless, Prémontval supposes that bodies 
are composites of these unextended simples.25
With his quasi- Leibnizian ontology in place, Prémontval insists that in the 
great question of the commerce between soul and body, the issue is not the com-
merce between soul and body considered as two substances, but rather “between 
one simple being and a multitude of simple beings subordinate to it,” which in turn 
boils down to “the commerce between one simple being and another simple being, ei-
ther of the same nature or of an inferior nature” (Prémontval 1766: 382/2018: 
246). Having reframed the problem in this way, Prémontval proceeds to sketch 
out his system of psychocracy, which holds not only “that the soul and the body 
have a reciprocal action upon each other” but that “this action is real, and very 
real, but not physical” (1766: 380/2018: 245). Or more fully,
The soul really acts on the body, and the body really acts on the soul. What 
does this mean? It means that changes occur in the body which have their 
cause and their ground not in the preceding states of the body or in the 
intervention of a third being different from the soul and the body, such 
as God, but in a modification of the soul; and likewise, changes occur in the 
soul which have their cause and their ground not in the preceding states of 
the soul or in the intervention of a third being different from the soul and 
the body, such as God, but in a modification of the body. (Prémontval 1766: 
380/2018: 245)
What Prémontval appears to have in mind here is a direct action between 
soul and body. Although he never explicitly describes it that way, it is difficult 
to see what else would be consistent with his assertion that “action, ultimately, 
24. “Therefore supreme wickedness does not reside in an intelligent individual, or in an un-
intelligent individual (that much is clear), but in the collection of all individuals, all imperfect be-
ings, both intelligent and sentient and brute. This is what is called extension or matter” (Prémontval 
1755a: 383r/2018: 215). Also: “Matter is not an unknown something which serves as the basis for every-
thing, or that of which everything is composed, without tendency, without force. On the contrary, it is that 
which is composed of everything, that which contains everything, that which has all forces, all tendencies” 
(Prémontval 1759: 410/2018: 200).
25. Prémontval (1766: 385/2018: 248). Unfortunately Prémontval does not explain how bodies 
arise from simples, though given his ontology is closely related to that of Leibniz and Wolff it is 
possible he would have adopted an answer offered by both, namely that bodies are to be under-
stood as phenomena. In any case, given Prémontval’s understanding of extension and matter as 
the collection of all imperfect simples, he could not have considered the question of how bodies 
arise from simples as one of how these simples are compounded to make extended or material 
things, which is how it is apt to be understood today. For Leibniz and Wolff, see Leibniz (1989: 
181), and Wolff (1737a: 172– 173, §§224– 226).
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only ever occurs from individual to individual, only from simple being to simple be-
ing” (Prémontval 1766: 385/2018: 248). But as the title and subtitle of Prémont-
val’s psychocracy memoirs makes clear, not all simples are equal— the soul has 
“dominion and governance” over the multitude of simples that compose the 
body. What this dominion and governance amounts to is not made clear, thanks 
to some frightful editing by Formey, who prepared the memoirs for publica-
tion. In the first memoir on psychocracy, Prémontval read out to the Academy 
the first six sections of his earlier memoir “La théologie de l’être,” interspersed 
with very lengthy exposition. However, the published version of the first mem-
oir on psychocracy contains only the first four sections of the “La théologie de 
l’être” along with the accompanying exposition; the text ends just as Prémontval 
is about to read out section five (“On thinking being”) of “La théologie de l’être.” 
Formey noted that the first psychocracy memoir was too long to be published in 
its entirety (Prémontval 1766: 374 editor’s note/2018: 268). However, the omitted 
material from the first memoir is not to be found elsewhere; it was not printed 
in the remaining memoirs, and Prémontval’s original manuscripts are no longer 
extant.26 This is unfortunate, not least because section six of “La théologie de 
l’être,” entitled “On the body and soul,” touched upon the soul’s relationship to 
the body. In “La théologie de l’être” this is treated very cursorily, because the 
aim of the text is to develop a proof for the existence of God rather than a theory 
of soul- body relations, and the analysis goes no deeper than this:
I see in it [sc., my body] different composites, very distinct, more or less 
united into a whole, through which I am affected and which I affect in 
turn. It is therefore a multitude of beings, subordinate to me, upon which 
I exercise a kind of authority, but in a way that is not always equally 
peaceful. It is far from being the case that I reign as absolute sovereign, 
nor can I maintain order as I want, preventing all seditions and revolts. 
(Prémontval 1757: 484/2018: 176)
We may surmise that in the first psychocracy memoir, when discussing this 
passage (and indeed the entire section of the text from which it comes) Prémont-
val would have developed this thought and given some indication of how the 
dominance of the soul and the subordination of the simples of the body affected 
their action upon each other. But since this part of the memoir is now lost, we 
lack an important piece of information about how exactly the soul is dominant 
(doubly regrettable given that the name of Prémontval’s system— psychocracy— 
26. But that he did read out and expound upon the first six sections of “La théologie de l’être” 
is confirmed in the final document of the psychocracy memoirs, in which Prémontval states “I 
have already inserted in this work the first six sections of my ‘Theology of Being,’ accompanied by 
reflections and clarifications” (1768b: 374/2018: 299).
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suggests this is an important feature). Nevertheless, in what remains of the first 
psychocracy memoir, we do learn that every simple acts upon every other— 
which means that the soul must act on the entire body rather than just the brain 
or a part thereof, and vice versa— and are also told what this action is not:
I hold that they [sc., the simple beings of the soul and body] all have a 
real action upon each other, and at the same time it is clear that the most 
real action of a simple being has nothing mechanical, nothing physical, and 
that it is nothing composite and material. (Prémontval 1766: 384/2018: 247)
We may read this as a denial that the action between soul and body involves 
the sort of operations that would or could fit under any of the various models of 
mechanical causality that were prevalent at the time. As there is no prospect of a 
transfer of parts or accidents or properties between simple beings (for, as simple 
beings, there is nothing that could break away from them to transfer to another),27 
their interaction cannot be “composite and material,” and given that simples are 
immaterial their interaction cannot involve contact, contiguity, or collision, and 
so cannot be “mechanical” either. Moreover, when Prémontval asserts that ac-
tion between simples is non- physical this is all he means, that is, that the nature 
of the action is such that it falls outside the domain of the natural sciences and so 
is not the sort of thing that can be investigated by natural scientists.28 There is no 
suggestion that he takes this action to be in some way unnatural or supernatural, 
for example as being beyond the natural powers of the simple beings involved 
or requiring the intervention of a supernatural agent. Unfortunately some of his 
examples of non- physical action look apt to promote such a misunderstanding. 
For example, he avers that “A real and true action that is immaterial, or which 
has nothing mechanical, nothing physical, is not a new thing among philosophers 
who acknowledge simple and indivisible spiritual beings acting on each other” 
(Prémontval 1766: 380– 381/2018: 245). Although Prémontval does not elaborate 
further, he might have in mind here the claim, made by Pseudo- Dionysius (Dio-
nysius the Areopagite 1949: 52) and Aquinas (1981: 521, I.106.1) amongst others, 
that angels impart knowledge to each other, although this was obviously not 
couched in Prémontval’s eighteenth- century language of action between simple 
beings. Another of Prémontval’s examples involves the action of God on a cre-
27. Such an observation prompted Leibniz’s famous claim that monads are windowless:
Monads have no windows through which anything could enter them or depart from them. Acci-
dents cannot become detached, or wander about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the 
Scholastics once did. Thus neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from outside. (Leibniz 
2014: 15, Monadology §7).
28. We may surmise that it was not Prémontval’s intention to subvert physics (“a fine and 
useful science,” he insists), for his position does not in any way rule out there being higher order 
physical laws that are grounded in the metaphysical. See Prémontval (1761: II, 326/2018: 155).
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ated monad;29 he claims that God’s action, “according to the Leibnizians, is very 
real, and not physical. Well! I say as much, not only of the action of the soul on 
the body, but of the action of the body on the soul” (Prémontval 1768a: 343/2018: 
274). Here, Prémontval is not insinuating that God’s action is unnatural per se, or 
unnatural for God, only that it falls outside the purview of physics, as does the 
action between soul and body (or indeed between angels). The clear implication 
is that the proper domain of such action is metaphysics, not physics. Accord-
ingly, since the action occurs between simple beings rather than the compound 
structures formed therefrom, it would be just as legitimate to call it metaphysical 
action, though this is not a term Prémontval employs, preferring instead imma-
terial or non- physical action.
The non- physical or immaterial nature of such action would obviously rule 
out the soul directly impressing the physical quality of motion on the body. In-
stead, given that all simples are endowed with force, the process looks to be that 
the force of the soul directly brings about a change in the force of the elements 
of the body, which is then translated into motion. The reverse process would in-
volve the force of the body’s elements directly bring about a change in the force 
of the soul, which is then translated into a sensation or feeling. This is certainly 
a natural reading of Prémontval’s claim that, on his hypothesis, “it is a simple 
being, that is, a being which is not several beings, which acts on other beings like 
it, and receives their action as they receive its action” (1768a: 366/2018: 290).
The claim that psychocracy involves one being acting on “other beings like 
it” could be construed as Prémontval exploiting the fact that on his system, 
both the simple soul and the simples of the body have one thing in common, 
namely their simplicity. This is important inasmuch as the rival system of 
physical influx was often thought to be undermined by what R. C. Richardson 
has termed the “problem of heterogeneity” (1982: 20), that is, the fact that soul 
and body are both very different kinds of thing. The problem has its roots in 
a remark by Pierre Gassendi in the objections prepared in 1641 to Descartes’s 
29. Prémontval (1768a: 368/2018: 291). Compare with Leibniz: “There is also no way of ex-
plaining how a monad could be internally altered or changed by any other created thing” (2014: 
15, Monadology §7). Leibniz here explicitly rejects one created monad affecting another but seems 
to leave open the possibility that God could alter or change them. There are other texts in which 
Leibniz appears to claim that God does modify monads, e.g., when he writes to Des Bosses in 1713: 
“The modifications of one monad are the ideal causes of the modifications of another monad . . . 
insofar as reasons appear in one monad which, from the beginning of things, prompt God to pro-
duce modifications in another monad” (Leibniz 2007: 299). However, the action of God referred to 
here is not on a monad as such, but rather on the idea of a monad. Others have argued, plausibly I 
believe, for a deflationary reading of passages such as this, in which Leibniz is to be understood as 
claiming that when God creates a particular set of monads (whose essences are fixed and unalter-
able) that harmonize with each other it is as if he had modified them so as make them harmonious. 
See, e.g., Puryear (2010: especially 789– 794).
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Meditations. Faced with Descartes’s assertion that soul and body form a union, 
Gassendi objected,
There can be no intermingling between things unless the parts of each of 
them can be intermingled. And if you are something separate, how are 
you compounded with matter so as to make up a unity? Moreover, since 
all compounding, conjunction or union takes place between the compo-
nent parts, must there not be some relationship between these parts? Yet 
what relationship can possibly be understood to exist between corporeal 
and incorporeal parts? (Gassendi, “Fifth set of objections,” in Descartes 
1984– 1991: II, 238)
In the 18th century, the problem of heterogeneity was forcefully pressed by Leib-
niz (1985: 155, §59), and then by Bilfinger (1723: 60– 61, §59), who insisted that 
there was no “common proportion” between soul and body, and hence there 
could be no “society” or connection between them (as the physical influxionists 
supposed) since such society presupposes a common proportion. This led some 
influxionists to reconceive the soul in order to give it the common proportion 
with the body that they felt it needed. For example, Andreas Rüdiger (1727: §21) 
supposed that as all action involved contact, the soul must be extended and so in 
a position to make contact with the body. Christian August Crusius (1747: 146, 
§80), meanwhile, supposed that the soul must be in motion in order to impart 
motion to the body. On the other hand, influxionists who approached the prob-
lem of union of soul and body with a broadly Leibnizian or Wolffian ontology of 
simples were largely untroubled by the problem of heterogeneity, and certainly 
did not feel the need to effectively “physicalize” the soul in the ways envisaged 
by Rüdiger and Crusius. Johann Peter Reusch (1735: 537, §794), for example, 
argued that the physical action between soul and body was no more or less prob-
lematic than that between different bodies, given that in both cases the action in 
question was merely that between simple substances. Although it is not obvious 
how the property all simples have in common— namely their simplicity— makes 
the action between them more intelligible (given that there is no suggestion that 
action is in any way facilitated through simplicity), Prémontval likewise showed 
no signs of being troubled by the problem of heterogeneity, perhaps for the same 
reason identified by Reusch.
With his psychocracy sketched out, Prémontval proceeds to consider the ri-
val systems of soul- body commerce. He quickly rejects the system of physical 
influx as unsuitable. Following Leibniz’s lead, Prémontval associated the sys-
tem, as many early moderns did, with the Scholastics or Peripatetics (see, e.g., 
Prémontval 1768a: 343/2018: 274). Accordingly, the stock objection to physical 
676 • Lloyd Strickland
Ergo • vol. 5, no. 25 • 2018
influx (derived from Leibniz) was that it involved a transfer of parts or quali-
ties, which was inconceivable between simple substances (see, e.g., Leibniz 2014: 
15, “Monadology” §7). However, this is not the objection Prémontval makes. 
Instead, he points out that, under Scholasticism, action could not occur between 
simple beings, but only between a simple soul and an infinitely- composite body. 
For according to Scholasticism, he claims, the body
is a mass, composed of other masses again composed of other masses, com-
posed of an infinity of masses, again composed of an infinity of masses, 
and always of masses, to infinity. Consider the action of the soul on one 
of these masses to the thousandth or hundred- millionth subdivision: it is 
the same thing as to the first subdivision, or as on the whole universe. It 
is always upon an infinity of masses that the soul must act at once, and it is 
always an infinity of masses which must act at once upon the soul. There is 
no purchase anywhere. Nowhere beings, everywhere an infinity of beings. 
(Prémontval 1766: 383/2018: 246– 247)
Needless to say, as a depiction of Scholasticism this is something of a cari-
cature, as a variety of positions can be found among Scholastic thinkers. For ex-
ample, some denied the infinite divisibility of bodies outright, some claimed that 
bodies were infinitely divisible in thought but not in actuality, while yet others 
allowed that prime matter was infinitely divisible but sensible matter was not. 
Nevertheless, there were some medieval thinkers, such as Richard of Middleton 
and Marsilius of Inghen, who did hold something like the position Prémontval 
ascribes synecdochically to the Scholastics here (for details, see Duhem 1985: 35– 
45). In such a case, where the body is infinitely divisible, Prémontval argues that 
the soul would find no purchase, being unable to find any simple beings upon 
which it could act, and so the process of physical influx could not get started. 
Physical influx is thus rejected on the slightly oblique grounds that, as it is a Scho-
lastic hypothesis, and as Scholasticism does not recognize the body as a collection 
of simple beings, it could not explain how one simple being (the soul) can have 
commerce with other simple beings (constituting the body), which for Prémont-
val was the real issue when it came to explaining the union of soul and body.
But quite why Prémontval restricted himself to characterizing physical influx 
as a Scholastic hypothesis is unclear, as by 1763 a variety of physical influx theo-
ries had been developed, as we have already seen.30 Moreover, Prémontval was 
surely aware of at least some of these theories. To give one example, in a 1759 
paper Johann Jacob Hentsch had sketched out a version of physical influx theory 
which held that “the human mind is endowed with a force or tendency to move the 
30. For further details of some of these theories, see Watkins (1995) and Watkins (1998).
 The “Fourth Hypothesis” on the Early Modern Mind-Body Problem • 677
Ergo • vol. 5, no. 25 • 2018
subtlest fluids in the nerves of the body through action at a distance, without any force 
passing from the mind to the body.”31 Prémontval was clearly aware of Hentsch’s 
version of physical influx theory because he was present during Formey’s dis-
cussion of it in the Berlin Academy, as noted earlier.
Nevertheless, having shown to his own satisfaction that physical influx was an 
unsuitable system for explaining the commerce of simple beings, Prémontval turns 
his attention to the other two rival systems, occasionalism and pre- established har-
mony, subjecting them to a sustained and sometimes brutal critique. He attempts 
to show that when considered properly, the two systems ultimately amount to 
the same thing, with the only difference being the language in which they were 
couched (with Leibniz’s being by far the more obscure, according to Prémontval) 
(Prémontval 1768a: 365/2018: 289). Prémontval (1768a: 357/2018: 284) also charges 
that both occasionalism and pre- established harmony destroy human freedom 
because God does everything in both systems (given the notion of continued cre-
ation that both endorse and Prémontval rejects). Prémontval’s objections to the 
two systems are worthy of a longer treatment than is possible here.
While Prémontval sometimes indicates that his aim in the psychocracy mem-
oirs is the modest one of showing that his system is possible (e.g., Prémontval 
1766: 379/2018: 244), there is no doubt that he takes his system to be superior to 
the other three. As for why it took so long for this apparently superior system 
to emerge, Prémontval claims that his psychocracy might have been developed 
much earlier had it not been for the unfortunate way Leibniz had chosen to illus-
trate the other three systems in a well- known 1696 paper on his pre- established 
harmony. The offending passage is this one:
Imagine two clocks or watches which perfectly agree. Now this could 
happen in three ways. The first consists in a mutual influence. The sec-
ond is to have them managed by a worker who sets them right at each 
moment. The third is to make them with such skill and accuracy that we 
could be certain of their agreement from then on. Now put the soul and 
the body in the place of these two clocks. The first way is the way of influ-
ence of ordinary philosophy; the second is the continuous assistance of 
the creator in the system of occasional causes; the third is the pre- established 
harmony.32
31. Hentsch (1759: 558). A curious feature of Hentsch’s hypothesis is that interaction goes 
only one way, namely from soul to body, for while the body is modified directly by the soul’s 
action at a distance, the soul is modified only by itself, in light of changes it observes in the body 
rather than by the body itself.
32. Prémontval (1768a: 367/2018: 290– 291). Prémontval here quotes from Leibniz (1740: II, 
397– 398). However, Prémontval’s quote is more of a summary than a quotation proper. The pas-
sage actually reads:
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According to Prémontval, the problem with the two clocks example is that it 
automatically steers one to thinking of action as physical rather than immaterial, 
the latter being highly unlikely to come to mind.33 Prémontval claims that he was 
not misled only because he had developed his own solution to the problem of 
soul- body unity prior to undertaking a study of Leibniz, which enabled him not 
only to forge a new system but also to see why others had missed it.
2. A “Fourth Solution”?
Nevertheless, in spite of his claims to have discovered a distinct fourth solution 
to the problem of the union of soul and body, Prémontval fully expected “the 
Leibnizians” to conclude that his psychocracy “is only the peripatetic hypoth-
esis, physical influence, explained differently” (1768a: 343/2018: 274). Certainly 
there is no prospect of anyone supposing that the system of psychocracy could 
ultimately boil down to either occasionalism or pre- established harmony. The 
question, then, is whether Prémontval’s system is distinct from the hypothesis 
of physical influx or merely a variation thereof.
There is, as far as I know, no literature that explicitly addresses this question, 
though a recent claim by Eric Watkins, although not made with Prémontval’s 
system in mind, nevertheless implies that it would have qualified as a version 
of physical influx. In a discussion of the development of physical influx theory, 
Watkins writes, “Physical Influx is not a theory that applies only to material 
substances. Accordingly, the term ‘physical’ in physical influx should be taken 
not literally (as corporeal), but rather as natural (as opposed to hyperphysical or 
supernatural)” (1995: 296, Note 4). If Watkins is correct it means Prémontval’s 
system of psychocracy would automatically qualify as a version of physical in-
flux theory in spite of his claims to the contrary. However, Watkins offers no 
evidence to support his claim or its implication that any theory of interaction 
between soul and body would automatically qualify as physical influx irrespec-
Imagine two clocks or watches which perfectly agree. Now this could happen in three ways. The 
first consists in a mutual influence. The second is to have them managed by a skilful worker who 
sets them right and then keeps them in agreement at each moment. The third is to make these two 
clocks with such skill and accuracy that we could be certain of their agreement from then on. Now 
put the soul and the body in the place of these two clocks; their agreement or sympathy will also 
happen by one of these three ways. The way of influence is that of ordinary philosophy, but as we 
cannot conceive material particles which can pass from one of these substances into the other, we 
are obliged to abandon this view. The way of continuous assistance of the creator is that of the sys-
tem of occasional causes. But I hold that this is to invoke a Deus ex machina in a natural and ordinary 
thing, where according to reason God should only intervene in the way that he concurs with all 
other natural things. Thus there remains only my hypothesis, that is, the way of harmony.
33. And conversely, he claims, had Leibniz chosen as his example two monads, that would 
have automatically steered readers to think of action as immaterial rather than physical, the latter 
again highly unlikely to come to mind. See Prémontval (1768a: 367/2018: 291).
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tive of how this action was conceived. In any case, it strikes me as unlikely that 
we will be able to reach a definitive answer as to whether Prémontval’s system 
constitutes a distinct fourth hypothesis simply by asking whether the “physical” 
in “physical influx” meant “natural” or something else, especially since 18th cen-
tury thinkers typically didn’t state precisely what they meant by it. Accordingly, 
a more fruitful way of assessing the distinctiveness (or otherwise) of Prémont-
val’s system is to compare it with various models of physical influx.
When we make such a comparison, we find that the evidence for distinctive-
ness is mixed, as Prémontval’s system is very different from some models of 
physical influx while ostensibly quite similar to others. To begin with, recall the 
features of some of the models of physical influx we have already encountered, 
namely Rüdiger’s suggestion that the soul is extended and so can make contact 
with the body and Crusius’s suggestion that the soul must be in motion in order 
to impart motion to the body. To these we can add Martin Knutzen’s (2009: 71) 
suggestion that the soul (or mind) is in space and has the property of resistance, 
by which it is able to act on the body as well be acted upon by it. While these 
influxionists surely did conceive of the action between soul and body as natural, 
they also conceived it in much the same way as the physicists of the day con-
ceived action between bodies.34 In each case, the model of physical influx works 
by physicalizing the soul, that is, by supposing the soul has some physical or 
corporeal property (extension, motion, resistance) by means of which it is able to 
act upon the body in the same way that bodies act upon each other. Prémontval’s 
system is very different, in that it neither physicalizes the soul nor supposes that 
the action between soul and body occurs via some physical or corporeal prop-
erty. Compared to Rüdiger, Crusius, and Knutzen’s theories of physical influx, 
Prémontval’s system does look quite distinct.
However, not all physical influx theories had the features we see in those of 
Rüdiger, Crusius, and Knutzen. Other models refrained from physicalizing the 
soul and explicitly departed from classical models of mechanical causality in 
important ways. For example, in 1733 Johann Gottsched claimed that when he 
spoke of physical influence, “The word ‘influence’ is taken in a metaphorical or 
indirect sense; but it is easy to understand that only the transitive effects from 
one being into the other are understood thereby” (1762: 582, §1067). Gottsched 
thus gestures towards a conception of physical influence in terms of a direct 
34. This is true also of Hentsch, who supposed that the soul acted on the body via action at 
a distance, a model of corporeal causality that was seen as respectable in some quarters due to its 
association with Newton’s theory of universal gravitation. Isaac Watts, for example, argued that 
the success of Newton’s action- at- a- distance model of causation among bodies meant that it could 
plausibly be extended to apply to the action of soul upon the body. See Watts (1733: 152– 154).
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action rather than a true influence (literally flowing- in) of anything.35 While Pré-
montval tended to reserve the term “influence” for the hypothesis of physical 
influx, he did claim that the reciprocal action he recognized between body and 
soul could be characterized as “an influence, if you will, but . . . not a physical 
influence” (Prémontval 1766: 380/2018: 245), indicating that he did not want to 
use the term any more literally than did Gottsched. Some later influxionists fol-
lowed Gottsched’s lead and sought to characterize physical influx in ways that 
presented the theory as involving a form of causality quite different from the 
models of mechanical causation prevalent at the time. In 1735, for example, Jo-
hann Peter Reusch argued that the action of one substance on another was based 
on the first determining changes in the other, by serving as the occasion for the 
other to change its own force with respect to tendency or impetus, though he 
was adamant that this involved no transfer of force. Hence he claims “No force is 
transferred from one substance into another through influx, but some new limi-
tations arise through its own force of substance, which is incited by a[nother] 
substance in a contingent way.”36 Here again, physical influx does not literally 
involve an influx; as Reusch conceives it, one substance has the power or capac-
ity to incite a change in another, in what looks to be a direct, unmediated way.
Now although none of the aforementioned influxionists commented on Pré-
montval’s system of psychocracy, we might suppose that while some (Rüdiger, 
Crusius, Knutzen) might have construed Prémontval’s psychocracy as some-
thing quite distinct from physical influx theory, given its great differences from 
their models thereof, others (Gottsched, Reusch) might have construed it as a 
model of physical influx due to its similarities with their own models of this 
theory. But given the vast range of different models that fell under the rubric of 
physical influx theory, it must remain entirely conjectural as to whether these or 
other proponents of the theory would have identified Prémontval’s system as 
something distinct from it or not. Ultimately, the only way to answer the ques-
tion “was Prémontval right that he found a fourth hypothesis?” is relative to 
various notions of physical influx, and there is no clear way of privileging one 
notion over another. Accordingly, the safest conclusion to draw is that Prémont-
35. Taking “influence” in a metaphorical sense was nothing new. Even Francisco Suarez— 
sometimes thought to be the originator of influx theory— had made a similar claim, asserting, “that 
word ‘inflow’ should not be taken strictly, in the way it is usually attributed to the efficient cause 
in particular, but more generally, as equivalent to ‘giving’ or ‘communicating’ being to another” 
(Suarez 1630: 243, XII.2.4). As O’ Neill has pointed out, “in the 17th century philosophical lexicons 
it was standard practice to explicitly mark as metaphorical the use of the term ‘inflow’ to character-
ize a cause” (1993: 39).
36. Reusch (1735: 534, §792). Although not couched in the same language, Reusch’s sugges-
tion bears more than a passing resemblance to Aquinas’s claim that, when acting, the agent does 
not pass anything to the patient, but merely induces change out of the patient’s own potentiality. 
See Aquinas (1956: 235, 69.28).
 The “Fourth Hypothesis” on the Early Modern Mind-Body Problem • 681
Ergo • vol. 5, no. 25 • 2018
val’s psychocracy represents an option distinct from physical influx according to 
some notions of physical influx but not according to others.
3. Conclusion
By way of a conclusion, it is worthwhile considering how successful Prémont-
val’s system is as a solution to the problem for which it was designed, namely 
that of how soul and body could form a unity. While I do not propose to under-
take a full- blown assessment, it is helpful to consider the two known objections 
to Prémontval’s system, both of which were made after his death.
The first objection is found in an anonymous review of the 1764 edition of 
Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences et des Belles- Lettres de Berlin, the volume 
which contains the first of the three psychocracy essays. The reviewer writes 
that Prémontval “maintains that the action of these two beings upon each 
other [sc., soul and body], although very real, is not physical. What is it then? 
Mr D. P. should have explained it, and rendered his metaphysics a little less 
unintelligible.”37 Here, the reviewer’s complaint is that Prémontval has not suf-
ficiently explained his notion of non- physical action, which is understandable 
because it is surely true that Prémontval provides little detail about it. That be-
ing said, since he appears to understand this action as something direct and im-
mediate it is difficult to see what level of detail he could provide beyond giving 
the sort of examples he does (namely spiritual beings like angels acting on each 
other, and God acting on a created monad). In any case, Prémontval often makes 
it very clear that he is unprepared to speculate further about how immaterial 
action works on the grounds that he simply doesn’t have the details to give. In 
such a case, he suggests, silence is the best policy.38 It should be noted that a 
similar response was sometimes used by proponents of physical influx theories 
to charges that the mechanism of causation between body and soul was vague or 
obscure. For example, in 1733, in a defence of his own model of physical influx, 
Johann Gottsched (1762: 552, §1081) conceded that we no more know how the 
soul acts on body than we know how one body acts on another but that in light 
of our ignorance of the latter it is no objection that his theory could not adequate-
ly explain the former. Prémontval’s response is clearly cut from the same cloth.
The second objection to Prémontval’s system (and the only other critique of 
it I have been able to find) was written in 1851 by Christian Bartholmèss, in his 
37. Journal Encyclopédique, dédié à Son Altesse Sérénissime, Mgr. le Duc de Bouillon, &c &c. &c 1. 
Aout 1766 (1766: 13).
38. Prémontval (1768a: 366/2018: 290): “I am careful not to throw myself into details where all 
philosophers have failed, and where I have no doubt I would fail like the others. I am silent about 
what I do not know.”
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history of the Berlin Academy. There, Bartholmèss offers a broadly sympathetic 
account of Prémontval’s system, but claims that Prémontval’s failure to explain 
how the inferior simples of the body can have an effect on the superior simple of 
the soul meant that his system could not be reckoned an improvement over the 
others.39 Underpinning Bartholmèss’s concern is the old Scholastic question of 
how the lower could act upon the higher, which for many medieval thinkers was 
the main concern when seeking to explain the relationship between soul and 
body (see Rozemond 1999: especially 437– 444). The problem of hierarchy, as we 
might call it, troubled some 18th century thinkers too, and led some proponents 
of physical influx to suppose that action could go only one way, from soul to 
body.40 However, most proponents of physical influx were simply untroubled 
by this problem, and accordingly it might seem unreasonable to expect Prémont-
val to have been much concerned with it either. Certainly, given the central claim 
of his system, he would have rejected any suggestion that the lower couldn’t in 
principle act upon the higher, though this in itself does not address the objec-
tion, which is concerned with how the lower could act upon the higher. As noted 
in Section 1, it is likely that Prémontval was alert to this issue, but if he did ad-
dress it in his psychocracy memoirs then the relevant part has not survived, due 
to Formey’s poor editing. But even though we do not have Prémontval’s own 
answer, we can speculate as to the shape it might have taken. Thus we might 
suppose him saying that since each body contains an infinite number of simples, 
it is the sheer quantity of these simples that explains how the inferior simples 
of the body can act on the superior soul, for although the action of each one is 
minimal and inefficacious in its own right, the accumulation of all these actions 
is sufficient to have an effect on the soul. This is, of course, entirely speculative, 
but at least gives us an idea of how Prémontval’s system could explain the action 
of the inferior simples of the body on the superior simple of the soul.
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